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RECENT DECISIONS
aliens. Judicious application on the part of the law enforcement officials,
however, has kept arrests within bounds and the statute today remains
as a strong deterrent to aliens seeking to masquerade as United States
citizens.
IRVING W. ZIRBEL
Torts - Undertaking Establishments as a Nuisance - Defendant, an
undertaker, purchased three lots in the city of Fort Dodge, Iowa, and
began excavation for a funeral home. Plaintiffs owned a large resi-
dence across the street from the defendant's property. The area con-
tained some of the older and better residences of the city, but the busi-
ness district had moved to within one block of the properties. Plaintiff
sought an injunction restraining defendant from erecting the estab-
lishment on the grounds that it would have such a depressing effect
upon the members of his family as to impair their comfort and enjoy-
ment of their home and depreciate the value of their property.
Held: Injunction denied. Since the block in which the plaintiffs lived
was not zoned and in a state of transition from residential use to com-
mercial use, and was not restricted by ordinance to residential uses. The
plaintiffs would not see caskets loaded or undoaded, or hear funeral
services, and it did not clearly appear that a nuisance would necessarily
result. Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 43 N.W. (2d) 726 (Iowa, 1950).
In considering the problem involved in the main case the courts dis-
tinguished between a funeral home being established in a residential
district from one being established in a business district. In either case
the undertaking business has generally been held not to be a nuisance
per se.1 However, when established in a residential area the courts re-
quire a higher degree of proper conduct of the business and do consid-
er the depressing effect on the neighbors.
In an earlier Iowa case the undertaking establishment was enjoined
from continuing operation, but there the establishment was to be lo-
cated in a purely residential district, and the driveway where the bodies
were to be loaded and unloaded was only nineteen feet from that plain-
tiff's hoise, and the building was not to be soundproofed. In the princi-
pal case loading of bodies was to be done within the enclosure of the
building on the far side of the establishment from the plaintiff's house,
and the building was to be soundproofed. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court3 has held that an undertaking establishment would be enjoined as
a nuisance when located in a purely residential district when it operated
266 CJ.S. 820 (1950).
2 Bevington v. Otte, 223 Iowa 509, 273 N.W. 98 (1937).
3 Cunningham v. Miller, 178 Wis. 22, 189 N.W. 531 (1922).
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materially to decrease the market value of the adjoining property, and
created a dread of contagious diseases and discomfort from sights,
noises, and odors.
A nuisance is the wrongful use by an owner or possessor of land
resulting in an unreasonable interference with the rights of enjoyment
of the owner or possessor of neighboring land.4 Thus each landowner
in a residential district is limited to that use of his land which will not
disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood, arouse fear or disease,
or cause the property value of the neighborhood to depreciate. Con-
stant reminders of death, such as an undertaking establishment and the
activities connected with it, give rise to, impair in a substantial way the
comfort, repose, and enjoyment of the homes which are subjected to
them.5 While courts recognize that persons living in an organized com-
munity must suffer some damage, annoyance, and inconvenience from
each other, the courts will protect them from any unnecessary damage
or annoyance by his neighbor's unreasonable use of his property. The
question of reasonable use is to be determined in view of the use of
others, and it is a violation of the neighbor's right to enjoy his property
which is the essence of the wrong in these cases.6
In determining whether one is entitled to injunctive relief because
of the depressing influence and discomfort caused by the proximity of
an undertaking establishment, the depressing influence must be such
as would be experienced by a normal man of average sensibilities., The
objection to the business must be more than imaginary, or felt by one
who is supersensitive, nor can the objection be merely the proximity
of the establishment 8s
When the undertaking establishment is to be located in a business
district the courts do not seem to consider the depressing effect upon
the neighbors, but seem to feel that it is a necessary business and will
not enjoin the undertaking establishment unless it is clearly improperly
conducted.9 "If it is a nuisance at all, it must be because of the manner
in which it is conducted or the situation in which it is placed."'1 Thus
there must be a showing that the undertaking establishment is clearly
improperly conducted to enjoin it from doing business in a commercial
district, and it is not enough to show a depressing effect on the neigh-
bors exerted by the incidents of the business there conducted."
In the main case the court applied the commercial rule and re-
quired the standard of conduct applicable to commercial districts. The
4 Walsh on Equity, 170 (1930).
5 Supra, Note 2.6 Walsh on Equity, 189 (1930).
7Lewis v. Maryland, 164 Md. 146, 164 A. 220 (1933).
8Bragg v. Ives, 149 Va. 482, 140 S.E. 656 (1927).
9 3 Cooley on Torts 180 (1932).
10 Kirk v. Mabis, 215 Iowa 769, 246 N.W. 759, 87 A.L.R. 1055 (1933).
11 Ibid.
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court reasoned that the district would became commercial in a short
time, and that such location would enhance the value of the surround-
ing property as business property.'2 This seems to be the better solution
to the matter from a practical standpoint since the business is a neces-
sary business and should not be required to locate in commercial dis-
tricts where traffic is congested or in outlying districts where they will
be difficult to reach.
Louis R. GILBERT
Taxation-The Statute of Limitations in Taxation-In 1931 tax-
payers exchanged old stock for new in a corporate reorganization. In
answer to taxpayers' request for a ruling on the transaction and having
a full disclosure of all the facts, the Commisioner advised them that
the 1931 transaction was a non-taxable corporate reorganization requir-
ing a carry over of the basis of the old stock to the new stock. How-
ever, on sale of the new stock in 1941, 1942, and 1943 the taxpayers
used the fair market value of the new stock in 1931 as the basis, con-
tending that the 1931 transaction was not a tax-free reorganization. The
Commissioner now concedes that the original transaction was taxable,
but asks that the taxpayers should not be allowed, long after the statute
of limitations bars deficiency assessment for the original tranaction, to
change their position. Held: Neither the doctrine of consistent dealing
nor estoppel will be employed to compel the taxpayer to be consistent
in treatment of a transaction if the taxpayer in good faith makes full
disclosure of all relevant facts to the Commissioner even though the
later inconsistent treatment results in a tax benefit to the taxpayer.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mellon, Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue v. Scaife, 184 F. (2d) 157 (3d cir., 1950).
In this case the Commissioner is seeking tp compel the taxpayers to
perpetuate an error because he is barred by the statute of limitations
from collecting the tax payable were the original transaction now
treated correctly. He is in effect trying to circumvent the bar of the
statute of limitations by compelling the taxpayer to carry over an in-
correct basis, thus including in the tax gains which should have been
taxed on the original transaction.
In the following special situations Congress has lifted the bar of
the statute of limitations by legislative action:
a) Where there is fraud or no return at all, the statute does not
start to run."
12 Frentiss v. Sicard, 181 Ark. 173, 25 S.W. (2d) 18 (1930).
' IRC §276 (a).
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